Ultra-Realism FAQ
Charles A. Coulombe
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What is an ultra-realist/neo-Platonist?
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Why do you think everyone should be
an ultra-realist?
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Do you think moderate realism contributed
to the decline of the Church?
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Who were some famous ultra-realists
and/or Christian Neo-platonists?
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Who were some famous moderate realists/Thomists?
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Why did ultra-realism go out of style?
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But isn't Thomism the official philosophy
of the Catholic Church?
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Wasn't the height of Thomism the high
point of the Church?
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What freedom does a Catholic have
in choosing a philosophy?
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Did St. Thomas Aquinas reject ultra-realism?
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On what issues did St. Thomas Aquinas
clash with St. Bonaventure?
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Which were you first, an ultra-realist
or a monarchist?
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Did you become one as the result
of the other?
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How is the Platonic world-view demonstrated
from Scripture?
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Specifically, why did the medieval
theologians/philosophers reject the doctrine of
the Immaculate Conception? It can't be because of
Aristotle because the Ultra realists, such as Bonaventure,
denied the doctrine as well.
1. What is an ultra-realist/neo-Platonist?
(Back to Top)
Letės start with the first part --- neo-Platonist. A "Platonist" is a follower
of the Greek philosopher Plato (428-348 B.C.). A disciple of Socrates (indeed,
Platoės written accounts of his teacher's thoughts are the only record we have
of them), Plato was also the mentor of Aristotle, with whom, however, he
disagreed in several ways. Plato's writings on various topics are voluminous. In
a nutshell, he taught that spirit is superior to matter, and that this physical
world at once symbolises and conceals a greater, spiritual one.
Various of his later followers over many centuries amplified
or elaborated one or another of his teachings. These are called Neo-Platonists.
There were and are many different schools of them, often differing wildly. The
Church Fathers, the Catholic writers of the first six centuries, were all
Neo-Platonists. Their teachings on the supremacy of the spiritual, etc., were
filtered through and corrected by Christian Revelation. For example, they did
not regard the flesh as evil, in the way that some Neo-Pagans did; rather,
although they found it inferior and often trying to the spirit, they knew that
the Body is destined to rise in glorified form on the Last Day, and spend
eternity with the Soul in heaven (or in hell, if that's how the individual
goes!). As to Ultra-Realism, this refers to a specific Platonic
teaching. Plato held that both abstract ideas like "love" and "truth" and
concrete things like "horse" or "table" were earthly manifestations of certain
"archetypes" or "universals." Thus, we are men because we partake of the
Universal "Man."
For Plato, these Universals subsist in a supernal realm of
their own, of which this one is a mere reflexion --- even as the things in it
are reflexions of the Universals. Christian Neo-Platonists, however, taught
that, while real, the Universals exist in the mind of God. They are, so to
speak, the patterns through which He continues to will the existence of Creation
minute-by-minute. This is called, in terms of classical philosophy, "Realism."
Plato's student Aristotle, however, was a materialist --- he
believed that matter was self-existent, with neither beginning nor end, and that
there is no personal God. For him, although the Universals are real in a sense,
they derive their reality from the sum total of their physical manifestations.
In other words, where Plato would teach that horses are horses because they
reflect "Horse," Aristotle held that "Horse" is "Horse" because it reflects
horses. The distinction (and the very ideas discussed!) may seem terribly
abstract, but as we shall see, they have had frightfully concrete results.
At any rate, when Aristotle was re-discovered in the 13th
century, and popularised by St. Thomas Aquinas, his view of the Universals came
to be called "Moderate Realism," as opposed to the older view, which received in
its turn the title of "Ultra-Realism." After a while, the two titles came to be
used interchangeably with Neo-Platonist on the one hand, and Aristotelian and
Thomist on the other. But of course, the two "Realist" titles refer to only one
aspect of either body of teaching, and in fact there have been Moderate Realists
who were Neo-Platonists in most other areas.
One key area where the question of the Universals affects
Catholic dogma is in understanding the Fall of Man. For the Ultra-Realist, it
was a simple question. Typical of their views was that of Odo of Tournai (d.
1113), summarised by Paul Glenn thusly:
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The human race is of one specific substance. At first, this
substance was found in only two persons. They sinned, and being the whole
human substance, this entire substance was vitiated by their sin. Hence
Original Sin is transmitted by natural necessity to all human individuals. New
births are not productions of new substances, but are merely new properties of
the already existing human substance. Individual men differ only accidentally.
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By the same token, Baptism has the effect of removing the
individual from the substance or Universal of Fallen Humanity, and inserting him
into that of Redeemed Humanity. In a nutshell, it makes of him a new creature.
This is all rather reminiscent of genetics, actually --- not surprising in the
light of the 1311 definition of the Council of Vienne, that the soul is the form
of the body. In this last we see again Plato's assertion that the material
symbolises the spiritual.
But for the Moderate Realists, the whole question of
the Fall is problematic. If the Universal "Man" derives its reality from the sum
total of men who have ever been or ever will be, how could the Sin of Adam taint
them all? As Fr. Frederick Copleston, S.J., a leading Thomist and historian of
philosophy put it, "How Theologians understand Original Sin to-day is not clear
to me." Nor could it be.
Another key teaching of most Ultra-Realists is that --- in
contradiction to Aristotle --- the Will precedes the Intellect. That is, that
the Will is the basic motive force of the personality which dominates and
controls the Intellect, the faculty which receives and processes information.
Central to understanding the significance of this teaching is the notion of Good
Will versus Bad Will. Good Will is love of Truth; Bad Will is love of self.
Obviously, all human beings have both sorts, in quantities which vary from time.
But to the degree that an individual is Good-willed, his intellect will discern
the Truth. To the degree that he is Bad-willed, his intellect will accept or
interpret perceived reality according to what fulfils his selfish motives. Thus,
someone who knows better can apostatise, while someone with a minimum exposure
to the Faith can convert. Of course, there are all sorts of other repercussions.
For the Moderate Realist, however, the Intellect precedes the
Will: one can only know Good if one is exposed to it or taught it. In a word,
the individual is at the mercy of his upbringing and education. Of course, were
this true, all those educated alike, with similar early-life experiences, would
turn out the same way. There could be neither apostasies nor conversions. We
know that this is not the case however.
There are a number of other differences, but these are
perhaps the most germane.
2. Why do you think everyone should be an ultra-realist?
Shouldn't it just suffice that one adheres to Church doctrine? (Back
to Top)
These are questions you might well ask a Thomist! But letės
tackle them in reverse. Firstly, for oneės salvation, per se, all you require
adherence to the Churchės doctrine. But we do not live in a vacuum. One has to
live oneės Faith, and deal with the world around him while he does so.
Philosophy in general is one's way of looking at reality. The minute you begin
to apply the Faith to living --- presto! You are a philosopher! Then it becomes
a question of what philosophy you will use.
The criteria are simple: does the given philosophy a)
gibe with the Faith?; and b) does it correspond to objective reality?
(there are of course schools of thought which maintain either that there is no
objective reality or that we cannot know what it is if it exists --- we need not
worry about those).
By this yardstick alone, Aristotelianism and its derivatives
are found wanting, because of their materialism: they are philosophies
ill-fitted for Catholics, because they deny the basis of Catholicism (even
though some of them affirm the Faith consciously), and because they are simply
untrue, as we shall see.
3. Do you think moderate realism contributed to the
decline of the Church? (Back to Top)
Indeed I do. In fact, it rocked the very foundations of both
the Medieval Church and State. Medievalist Norman F. Cantor of New York
University says:
We do not, however, need the romantic projection of the
Middle Ages. Directly accessible to us is the medieval intelligentsia's
perception of its own culture and society. In assessing their own world,
medieval intellectuals were heavily conditioned by a persistent idealism that
saw in society around them signs of the earthly incarnation of the Heavenly
City. The perception of the early-twelfth-century poet Bernard of Morval was
the base line in Medieval assessment: "God's own nation, God's own
congregation. Magnificent towers, fair homeland of flowers, thou country of
life [Trans. E.J. Martin].
The central dogma of the Incarnation likewise governed the
social perceptions of medieval people. They were preconditioned by the dogma
of the Incarnation, and the philosophy of "realism" which underlies it, to
find the ideal within the material, the beautiful within the ugly, the moral
and peaceful in the midst of violence and disorder. "The Word was made flesh,
and dwelt among usÖfull of grace and truth." Since everything was of divine
creation, medieval intellectuals had no doubt that all the pieces would
ultimately fit together in an idealistic, morally committed structure.
Whatever they saw or experienced was part of a divine manifestation.
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The Catholic or universal Church does not merely aim to be
an aggregation of particular Christian communities and of the believers
composing them; she regards herself as a superior power, as a reality distinct
from and independent of the individuals belonging to the fold. If the Idea,
that is, the general or universal, were not a reality, "the Church" would be a
mere collective term, and the particular churches, or rather the individuals
composing them, would be the only realities. Hence, the Church must be
[Ultra-] realistic, and declare with the Academy [Plato's School]: Universals
are real. Catholicism is synonymous with [Ultra-] realism.
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These notions had political repercussions as well. If a given
Pope or Emperor were evil, this was not held to diminish the essential goodness
of the Institutions which they headed. Moreover, resistance to evils committed
by Pope or Emperor did not necessarily imply disloyalty to Church or Empire.
Similarly, the doctrine grew up on the national level of the
"King's Two Bodies." The Body Political was simply the King as embodiment of the
Crown. He never died, nor could do any wrong. He was Crowned and anointed by God
through the medium of the country's leading prelate, and in some places was held
to have miraculous powers. Loyalty to the King was indeed a holy obligation.
But there also subsisted in the person of the King the Body
natural. This was the human being who wore the Crown at the moment. He could
sin, he could err, he would die. If he stepped out of bounds, if he broke the
law, then loyalty demanded he be compelled to step back within its bounds. Hence
Magna Carta is couched as a gracious confirmation of the rights of his Bishops
and Barons by a loving King. We moderns might consider it an exercise in
hypocrisy, since we know that King John was forced to sign it by the great men
of his realm. But it would not have been seen that way by either the King or the
Magnates.
This is because, for the Medievals, Law was also seen as
something self-existent; it bound King and Subjects alike. It could not be
created, and legislation in our sense did not exist. Rather, it was something to
be discovered and concretely applied to any given situation. It was thus
considered natural that different provinces should have wildly differing systems
of law, and that the King should reign in each province in accord with its
particular legal code. But that reign was, in itself, a very intangible thing. The
medieval world distinguished between authority and power. Authority, which came
from God, was the right to say what ought to be done; power was the ability to
make it happen. In a word, it was the difference between a doctor's authority to
prescribe, and his patient's power not to fulfil that prescription. Without the
Secret Police and Internal Revenue of the Modern State, the King's power outside
his capital, palaces, and estates was limited. Power was widely diffused among
the Church, nobility, and guilds. But the King's authority, subject to the law,
was unlimited. Hence, although there were no FBI nor RCMP to enforce it, the
King's Peace was observed on the King's Highways. When private citizens or
groups suppressed banditry, they did not (although unsubsidised by and often
unknown to the King) enforce peace on their own account, but in the name of the
King. If His Majesty wanted to bring a restive city or great lord to heel, he
must declare them outside his protection --- "outlawed." In a word, the Medieval
state, to a degree unbelievable to us to-day, rested upon an act of collective
Faith, a product of Neo-Platonism.
This being true of national entities, it was truer still of
the Holy Roman Empire. In theory, the Empire had never died. Rather, it
encompassed all of Christendom, and its frontiers ran wherever a baptised
Christian lived. Founded by Constantine and renewed (in the West) by
Charlemagne, it formed the psychological and spiritual bedrock of all European
governance. As Viscount Bryce puts it:
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The realistic philosophy, and the needs of a time when the
only notion of civil or religious order was submission to authority, required
the World State to be a monarchy: tradition, as well as the continued
existence of a part of the ancient institutions, gave the monarch the name of
Roman Emperor. A king could not be universal sovereign, for there were many
kings: the Emperor must be universal, for there had never been but one
Emperor; he had in older and brighter days been the actual lord of the
civilised world; the seat of his power was placed beside that of the spiritual
autocrat of Christendom. His functions will be seen most clearly if we deduce
them from the leading principle of medieval mythology, the exact
correspondence of earth and heaven [Neo-Platonism again! CAC]. As God, in the
midst of the celestial hierarchy, rules blessed spirits in Paradise, so the
Pope, His vicar, raised above priests, bishops, metropolitans, reigns over the
souls of mortal men below. But as God is Lord of earth as well as of heaven.
So must he (the Imperator coelestis ) be represented by a second earthly
viceroy, the Emperor ( Imperator terrenus), whose authority shall be of and
for this present life. And as in this present world the soul cannot act save
through the body, while yet the body is no more than an instrument and means
for the soulės manifestation, so there must be a rule and care of menės bodies
as well as their souls, yet subordinated always to the well-being of that
element which is the purer and more enduring. It is under the emblem of soul
and body that the relation of the papal and imperial power is presented to us
throughout the Middle Ages. The Pope, as Godės Vicar in matters spiritual, is
to lead men to eternal life; the Emperor, as vicar in matters temporal, must
so control them in their dealings with one another that they are able to
pursue undisturbed the spiritual life, and thereby attain the same supreme and
common end of everlasting happiness. In view of this object his chief duty is
to maintain peace in the world, while towards the Church his position is that
of Advocate or Patron, a title borrowed from the practise adopted by churches
and monasteries of choosing some powerful baron to protect their lands and
lead their tenants in war. The functions of Advocacy are twofold: at home to
make the Christian people obedient to the priesthood, and to execute priestly
decrees upon heretics and sinners; abroad to propagate the Faith among the
heathen, sparing not to use carnal weapons. Thus does the Emperor answer in
every point to his antitype the Pope, his power being yet of a lower rank,
created on the analogy of the papalÖThus the Holy Roman Church and the Holy
Roman Empire are one and the same thing, seen from different sides; and
Catholicism, the principle of the universal Christian society, is also
RomanismÖ
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Nor was this view confined to the West. Between 1394 and
1397, Anthony IV, Patriarch of Constantinople, wrote a letter to Prince Basil I
of Moscow, reprimanding the Muscovite Prince for having had the Byzantine
Emperorės name removed from the liturgy. The Patriarch
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took a particularly grave view of Basilės statement: "We
have the church, but not the emperor." To acknowledge the authority over
Russia of the Patriarch but not of the Emperor is, Anthony points out, a
contradiction in terms: for "it is not possible for Christians to have the
Church and not to have the Empire. For Church and Empire have a great unity
and community; nor is it possible for them to be separated from one another."
And, in an attempt to make the Russian sovereign see the grievous error of his
ways, and in pursuance of his own duty as "universal teacher of all
Christians," the Patriarch solemnly reiterated the basic principle of
Byzantine political philosophy. "The holy Emperor," he writes, "is not as
other rulers and other governors of other regions areÖ.He is anointed with the
great myrrh, and is consecrated basileus and autocrator of the Romans --- to
wit, of all Christians." These other rulers, "who are called Kings
promiscuously among the nations," exercise a purely local authority; the
basileus alone is "lord and master of the oikoumene," the "universal Emperor,"
"the natural King" whose laws and ordinances are accepted in the whole world.
His oecumenical sovereignty is made manifest by the liturgical commemoration
of his name in the churches of Christendom; and, as the patriarchės letter
pointedly implies, the prince of Moscow by discontinuing this practise within
his realm had deliberately rejected the very foundations of Byzantine law and
government.
There are few documents which express with such force and
clarity the basic theory of the Medieval Byzantine Commonwealth. The Patriarch
Anthonyės letter is a classic exposition of the doctrine of the universal East
Roman Empire, ruled by the basileus , successor of Constantine and vicegerent
of God, supreme law-giver of Christendom, whose authority was held to extend,
at least in a spiritual and "metapolitical" sense, over all Christian rulers
and peoples. The fact that this solemn and defiant political profession of
faith was made from the capital of a state that was facing political and
military collapse, only emphasises the astonishing strength and continuity of
this political vision which pervades the entire history of Byzantium and had
hitherto been accepted implicitly by the nations of Eastern Europe.
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This Imperial ideology, on the surface so foreign to our own
time, is nevertheless a key concept to grasp. Accepted from Ireland (whose High
King was held to "take stock" from the Holy Roman Emperors by the Brehon Laws)
to Russia, it has had numerous repercussions in subsequent history.
Kings and Emperors alike owed their allegiance and their
authority to the Church; indeed, it may be said that the Catholic religion
expressed via Neo-Platonism was quite simply the animating spirit of all sectors
of society, high and low. Because we tend to-day to focus our attention (favourable
or otherwise) on the externals of the Church --- her clergy, laws, and property,
we tend to forget that these were not the major concerns of Medieval Christians.
For them, the Church was a living thing, a Universal bound about and nourished
by the Seven Sacraments, through which she rescued those who entered her through
Baptism from the fallen world. Outside her portals lay only death and the
dominion of the devil; inside her bosom alone could humanity find personal
salvation. The figure of Noahės Ark was used to illustrate this point. Church
membership was necessary to avoid hell not because of mere technicality, but
because only her Sacraments applied the merits of Christ directly to the
believer. Without this application, the ruin wreaked by Adamės Fall on Creation
could not be expunged from the individualės soul, nor could he be incorporated
into the Body of Christ, without whom, as the Gospels told our ancestors, no one
could come to the Father.
The Medieval synthesis in Church and State began to unravel
early in the 13 th century. This was due in large part to the growth of
Aristotelian philosophy. As we have seen, the basically materialist, Aristotle
did not believe in a transcendent world of spirit superior to this one, by which
actions in this world must be gauged; he held that the Universals derived their
reality from the sum total of their parts --- their physical manifestations.
Although initially condemned by Church authorities (and regarded with suspicion
by the Franciscans, Augustinians and other theological schools for a
considerable time afterward), the attempted synthesis of Aristotlianism with
Catholicism had far reaching effects upon a society based in large degree upon
the unseen.
It took time for the Aristotelian worldview to pass down
through society (indeed, amongst much of the European peasantry it would be 1914
or later). But its results were close at hand. The notion of Christendom as an
invisible yet tangible organisation began to break down almost immediately. The
trans-national effort needed to establish and maintain the Crusader States in
Palestine and Syria began very quickly to wither as national rulers looked more
to their own affairs. By 1291, the last posts in the East had fallen. From that
time until 1571, when another international force defeated the Turks at the
battle of Lepanto, Islam would sweep through Asia Minor and the Balkans. Even
Lepanto did not halt their advance on land, and so late as 1683 the Turks would
come close to taking Vienna. The Muslims would roll over Greek and Bulgar, Serb
and Romanian, Croat and Magyar, with very little help from the distracted West.
Nor would the Russians receive much either, when the Tartars overwhelmed them.
These lessons would not be lost on the Christian East.
Kings ever more considered themselves independent of the
Empire, while the Guelph and Ghibelline struggles between supporters of the Pope
and the Emperor, the two pillars of Christendom, reduced Germany and Italy to
anarchy. Nor was the intangible Kingės peace spared, as the Thirty Years War (as
much a French civil conflict as a struggle between France and England) enveloped
France, after which the Wars of the Roses shattered England. Castile and various
other Spanish states likewise suffered civil war, even while struggling to eject
the Moors from their remaining possessions. The Black Death slaughtered
thousands, while the rise of a money economy altered the nature of European
commerce profoundly. Some men prospered, others went broke, and a bourgeoisie
began to rise alongside banking. The Church itself suffered the Great Schism; if
ever there were a signal that the old Christendom was vanishing, surely the
spectacle of three warring Popes was it.
As the 15th century progressed, however, in France, England,
and elsewhere, Kings and Princes attempted to tame the chaos with a new order,
based not upon theory, but fact: the nobles must be tamed, the Church
controlled, the provinces unified. The Tudors in England and the Valois in
France set themselves just that task. Nor were they the only ones.
All of this was merely external, however. The internal
effects upon Church belief were if anything, more devastating. The earlier
mentioned problem with Original Sin boiled and bubbled along. Then too, the
obvious contradictions between Catholic teaching and Aristotelian philosophy led
some philosophers to the "Double Truth," the notion that something can be true
in philosophy and false in theology, or vice versa. Thus, as in Orwellės 1984, a
Churchman could hold two mutually contradictory positions with equal fervour.
In time (about 1492, to be precise), a New World was
discovered, which appeared to be completely un-evangelised. In it were
multitudes who had never heard --- as it was thought --- of Christ and His
Church. To the still basically Neo-Platonic rank-and-file of Church members,
this was a grand opportunity. The spread of the Gospel to Men of Good Will had
always been a major priority. But for Aristotelians it posed a major problem.
Since, for them, the Intellect preceded the Will, they were
at a loss to understand why God would have created so many who had no
opportunity to receive the Faith. Not for them the knowledge of St. Francis
Xavier that he had been sent to the East Indies by God at the time he was due to
the Good Will and receptivity of his hearers; not for them the miraculous
bilocations of Ven. Maria de Agreda to similarly Good-Willed Indians; no, they
must decide for themselves that God had created folk who were incapable of
receiving the Faith.
This settled, they then attempted to maintain the justice of God by inventing
the notion of Invincible Ignorance, a term borrowed
from Moral Theology. In that area, it simply meant that
if a person did not know a sin was wrong, he was not
responsible. The Aristotelians then taught that if a
person did know the Faith, he did not need to know it,
he did not have to belong to it. He would be saved on
his own merits, so to speak, without membership in the
Church, the definition of which they could not arrive
at anyway. In time, this became the idea of the "Anonymous
Christian" --- universal Salvation. In a word,
the adoption of Moderate Realism led, over many centuries,
to the eventual political extinction of Christendom,
and essential dismissal of the Church as irrelevant
by its most influential theologians.

Bede
the Venerable (674-735)
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4. Who were some famous ultra-realists
and/or Christian Neoplatonists? (Back
to Top)
There is a long list, to be sure. In truth, I should probably
start with St. John the Evangelist. The prologue of his Gospel (to say nothing
of its body, his Epistles and the Apocalypse) sum up the whole of Christian
Neo-Platonism/Ultra-realism. One could add St. Dionysius the Areopagite, convert
of St. Paul, first Bishop of Athens, first Bishop of Paris, and author of The
Divine Hierarchies and other works. (Yes, I am aware that people since Luther
have declared that these four qualities belong to four separate Dionysii, and
insist on calling the author the "Pseudo-Dionysius;" I consider their
pretensions exploded by the writings of such as Dom Gueranger and the martyred
Archbishop Darboy).
I will give a chronological listing with names and dates, and
suggest that you run to the encyclopaedia to look them up!
St. Justin Martyr (d. 166)
St. Irenaeus (140-202)
St. Hippolytus (d. 235)
St. Clement of Alexandria (150-214)
Origen (185-254) Arnobius (d. 325)
Lactantius (d. 330)
St. Athanasius (295-373)
St. Basil the Great (331-379)
St. Gregory Nazianzen (330-391)
St. Gregory of Nyssa (332-395)
Synesius (370-413)
Nemesius of Phoenicia (5th century) St. Hilary of Poitiers (320-368)
St. Ambrose (340-397)
St. Jerome (331-420)
St. Augustine (354-430)
St. Leo the Great (400-461)
St. Prosper of Aquitaine (d. 463)
Claudius Mamertus (d. 473)
Boethius (480-522)
St. Gregory the Great (540-604)
St. Gregory of Tours (539-594)
St. Leander (534-601)
St. Isidore (570-636)
St. Idlephonse (d. 667)
St. Bede the Venerable (674-735) As you can see, the list encompasses virtually all of the
Church Fathers. And, of course, while this is not a matter of Faith, on matters
of Faith the unanimous opinion of the Fathers approaches Infallibility! Anyway,
letės continue into the Middle Ages.
Alcuin (735-804)
Fredegis (early 9th century)
John Scotus Erigena (810-878)
Gerbert [Pope Sylvester II] (945-1003)
St. Anselm (1033-1109)
Odo of Tournai (d. 1113)
Bernard of Chartres (d. 1130)
Thierry of Chartres (d. 1155)
William of Conches (1080-1154)
St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153)
Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141)
Robert Grosseteste (1170-1253)
Richard of St. Victor (d. 1175)
Walter of St. Victor (mid-12th century)
Bernard of Tours (mid-12th century)
William of Auvergne (d. 1249)
Alexander of Hales (d. 1245)
St. Bonaventure (1221-1274)
Roger Bacon (1214-1294)
St. Albert the Great [to a degree] (1193-1280)
Alexander of Hales (1170-1245)
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini [Pius II] (1405-1464)
Peter of Tarentaise [later Bl. Innocent V] (1224-1276)
St. Thomas Aquinas [surprise!] (1225-1274)
The inclusion of these last two will surprise many, no doubt.
But it is warranted because both were far more beholden to their predecessors
than to Aristotle. Nevertheless, St. Thomas Aquinas is regarded as the great
Catholiciser of Aristotle, and so, from now on, opposition to one is to some
degree, opposition to the other. Of course, it should be bourne in mind that St.
Thomas was canonised for his heroic virtue, not his philosophy.
Richard Fishacre (d. 1243)
John of La Rochelle (1190-1245)
Hugh of St. Cher (1200-1263)
Thomas of York (d. 1260)
Etienne Tempier (d. 1279)
Robert Kilwardby (1215-1279)
William de la Mare (d. 1290)
Gerard of Abbeville (1220-1272)
John Peckham (1220-1292)
Henry of Ghent (d. 1293)
Richard of Middleton (d. 1300)
Roger Marston (d. 1303)
Bl. Raymund Lully (1235-1315)
Matthew of Aquasparta (1240-1302)
Giles of Rome (1247-1316)
Peter Olivi (1248-1298)
William of Ware (1255-?)
Bl. John Duns Scotus (1266-1280)
Antonius Andre (d. 1320)
Francis of Mayron (d. 1325)
Meister Eckhart (1260-1327)
John of Bassoles (d. 1347)
Peter of Aquila (d. 1361)
John Tauler (1290-1361)
Bl. Henry Suso (d. 1366)
Bl. John Ruysbroek (1293-1381)
Gerard Groote (1340-1384)
Florentius Radewijns (1350-1400)
Peter dėAilly (1350-1420)
Henrik Mande (1360-1431)
John Gerson (1363-1429)
Raymund of Sabunde (d. 1432)
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)
Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471)
Cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472)
Johannes Rechlin (1455-1522)
Joannes Mauburnus (1460-1501)
Trithemius of Sponheim (1462-1516)
Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494)
John Colet (1467-1519)
Girolamo Seripando (1492-1563)
Paracelsus (1493-1541)
Geronimo Cardano (1501-1576)
Johann Gropper (1501-1559)
Maurice OėFihely
Antonio Trombetta
Francesco Licheto
Bernadino Telesio (1508-1588)
Francesco Patrizzi (1529-1597)
Johann Arndt (1555-1621)
Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639)
Godfrey Goodman (1583-1656)
Luke Wadding (1588-1657)
Henry More (1614-1687)
Claude Frassen (1620-1711)
Lodovico Sinistrari (1622-1701)
Bl. Junipero Serra (1713-1784)
Ignaz Frank (d. 1794)
Franz Wallraf (1748-1824)
Karl von Eckartshausen (1752-1803)
Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821)
Louis de Bonald (1754-1840)
Franz von Baader (1765-1841)
Joachim Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861)
Louis Bautain (1796-1867)
Augustine Bonnetty (1798-1879)
Casimir Ubaghs (1800-1875)
Alphonse Gratry (1805-1872)
Dom Prosper Gueranger (1805-1875)
Charles Lindley Wood, Lord Halifax (1839-1934)
Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900)
Arthur Machen (1863-1947)
Louis Charbonneau-Lassay (1871-1946)
Emile Grillot de Givry (1874-1929)
Montague Summers (1880-1947)
Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977)
J.R.R. Tolkien (1892-1973)
Leonard Feeney (1897-1978)
Valentin Tomberg (1900-1973) 5. Who were some famous moderate realists/Thomists?
(Back to Top)
The first was, to a degree, St. Albertus Magnus, followed of
course by St. Thomas himself. Of course, the argument may be made that St.
Thomas himself was not a Thomist, as that word is generally received. He did,
after all, quote St. Dionysius the Areopagite more than he did Aristotle. At any
rate, here are some of the more prominent Thomists down to our own day.
St. Robert Bellarmine
John Quidort
Thomas Jorz
Thomas Sutton
Herve of Nedellec
Peter of Auvergne
Godfrey of Fontaines
Humbert of Preuilly Paul Socinas (d. 1494)
John A Lapide (d. 1494)
Dominic of Flanders (d. 1500)
Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469-1534)
Francis de Sylvestris de Ferrara (1474-1528)
Francis de Vittoria (1480-1546)
Dominic de Soto (1494-1560)
Melchior Canus (1509-1560)
Bartholomew de Medina (1527-1581)
Peter Fonseca (1528-1599)
Domingo Banez (1528-1604)
Francis Toletus (1532-1596)
Louis Molina (1535-1600)
John de Mariana (1537-1624)
Francis Suarez (1548-1617)
Gabriel Vasquez (1551-1604)
Richard Hooker (1553-1600)
Marsilio Vasquez (d. 1611)
John of St. Thomas (1589-1644)
Jean Baptiste Gonet (d. 1681)
Antoine Goudin (1639-1695)
Blaise of the Holy Conception
Joseph Saenz de Aguirre (d. 1699)
Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892)
Joseph Kleutgen (1811-1883)
Desire Mercier (1852-1926)
Joseph Marechal (1878-1944)
Jacques Maritain (1882-1973)
Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)
Mortimer Adler (1902-)
Karl Rahner (1904-1984)
Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)
Emeric Coreth (1919-)
Some might object to the inclusion of Rahner, Lonergan,
Marechal and Coreth on this list; nevertheless, on all issues where more
mainstream Thomists disagreed with the Neo-Platonists, Augustinians, and Scotist,
the "Transcendental Thomists" (as Rahner, etc. labelled themselves) line up with
the Thomists. 6. Why did ultra-realism go out of style?
(Back to Top)
Why indeed? How to explain fads in philosophy, or anywhere
else? As we mentioned, Aristotelianism is materialistic. Did society become more
materialistic as Aristotelianism grew in influence, or vice versa? It is a sort
of chicken and egg question. But certainly, as the Renaissance, the Reformation,
and the Enlightenment succeeded each other, physical world loomed ever larger
into view, and the spiritual ever farther. Moreover, St. Thomasė canonisation,
and the employment of his philosophy (or, to be more accurate, more or less
distorted versions of it) in the Counter-Reformation, seemed to grant it
official status, as though it were THE Catholic philosophy. Why did moderate
realism go out of style? Like any revolutionary idea, it was left behind by more
radical developments. Conceptualism arose, which held that the Universals are
mere concepts; then came Nominalism, which held that they were mere names.
Luther, interestingly enough, was a Nominalist. In any case, over a long period
of time, Moderate realism was simply not spiritual enough to satisfy believers,
nor materialistic enough to satisfy non-believers. It is revealing that
(although there are exceptions either way), strict Thomists have tended to be
academics and scholars, whereas Catholic missionaries, lay writers, orthodox
liturgists, politicians, and so on have tended toward one or another variety of
Neo-Platonism --- even if they have not recognised it as such.
7. But isn't Thomism the official philosophy of the
Catholic Church? (Back to Top)
ErÖno. It does have a special status of sorts, thanks to Leo
XIIIės endorsement of it in his encyclical Aeterni Patris. But that same
encyclical gave equal status (though it did not treat it in any detail) to the
work of St. Bonaventure.
It is important to remember that, prior to St. Thomas, there
were twelve centuries of Church life without Thomism. The Churchės doctrinal
definitions, her liturgies, all her official acts up to that point were
originated without Thomist or Aristotelian influence. When such influence arose
in the 13th century, its adherents were called "Moderns," as opposed to the
Ultra-realist "Ancients." Several of St. Thomasė philosophical teachings were
condemned in the 1270s by the Archbishops of Paris and Canterbury, and by the
Universities of Paris and Oxford. Although the condemnations were lifted after
St. Thomasė canonisation in 1313, the Franciscans and Augustinians did not
accept Thomism, preferring in the case of the former St. Bonaventure and Bl.
Duns Scotus, and in that of the latter amplifications of St. Augustine. In any
case, the definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary ---
rejected by St. Thomas --- shows that Thomism cannot be considered the sole
authentic Catholic philosophy.
Of course, a lot of snide commentary by Thomist writer in the
philosophical textbooks of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s led to the use of such
phrases as "Exaggerated Realism" for Ultra-Realism. A friend of mine, Stephen
Frankini, was so annoyed by this that he took to calling Moderate Realism
"Inadequate Realism." In any case, the very existence of such books gave Thomism
an "official" feel to it not at all justified in reality.
8. Wasn't the height of Thomism the high point of the
Church? (Back to Top)
Not at all. No sooner did Thomism gain wide acceptance in the
14th century, than Nominalism came in and nearly superseded it. After that,
Thomismės finest hour was the period between 1918-1965. This produced the
Transcendental Thomism mentioned earlier, and the more mainstream "Neo-Thomism"
of men like Jacques Maritain.
In the period since the Council, the corrosive effect of
Transcendental Thomism has been made manifest. Less obvious has been that of
Neo-Thomism. The materialism implicit in it grew greater and greater; human
reason became --- practically speaking --- more important than revelation. In
the 13th century, the difference between Ultra- and Moderate Realism seemed to
be more one of emphasis, the more so since the proponents on both sides were
pious Catholics. Thus, as Angelus Gambatese tells us in his biography of St.
Bonaventure (p. 20):
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The Platonist sees things in God; the Aristotelian sees God
at the summit of things. If both philosophies lead to religion, it is
undeniable that the religious element is more spontaneous in a philosophy of
the Platonic type for it penetrates its very structure.
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By the same token, Aristotelian philosophies, with their
reliance on reason, become less and less religious; by so doing they become less
authentic. Dogmas become mere formulas, divorced from reality. Jacques Maritain
himself, at the end of his life, well described the process in his Peasant of
the Garonne:
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This "Thomist philosophy" was no theology, since they had
withdrawn from it the light proper to theology to transfer it into the kingdom
of reason using only its natural powers. Still less was it a philosophy, since
it remained structured after the theological treatise from which it emerged,
and possessed neither the gait and method, nor the light characteristic of
philosophical research. Without the characteristic light of theology, and that
proper to theological research, it had practically no light at all. (p. 136).
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This was a recipe for disaster --- the very disaster which
has overcome us.
9. What freedom does a Catholic have in choosing a
philosophy? (Back to Top)
An enormous amount --- so long as he always remembers that
the revealed Truths of our religion take precedence over any philosophy; and
that anything which conflicts with those Truths is simply false.
10. Did St. Thomas Aquinas reject ultra-realism?
(Back to Top)
Indeed he did. He followed Aristotle against Plato in
asserting that the Universals derive their reality from the sum total of their
physical examples. Moreover, he differed from then-accepted philosophy on a
number of different issues:
a. Plurality of Forms
This is the teaching that every individual person or thing is
made an individual by virtue of being a combination of various "substantial
forms" or qualities, which are real in themselves. For example, a certain person
is a Man, French, Baptised Catholic, Blue-Eyed, Breathing, Four-Limbed, and so
on. Each of these is a concrete expression of a Universal; taken together, they
form the individual we call Jean-Luc Sansargent. So it is for very individual
person or thing. Aristotle and St. Thomas taught, however, that the individual
is simply as he is, and all of his qualities accidental. Again, while seemingly
arcane on the surface, this question is filled with all sorts of implications
regarding sin and salvation; it was precisely on this point that St. Thomasė
teachings suffered the condemnations earlier mentioned.
b. "Rational Seeds" --- Seminal Reasons
This idea refers to the potentialities locked within each
substance and individual, which can lead to change, given the right stimulus.
For instance, the acorn has the oak-tree inside it; the wood has the potential
to be ash; water can be stem etc. Obviously we can see here the a foreshadowing
of genetic theory. But this too Aristotle and St. Thomas denied.
c. Divine Illumination
Here we see the Christian acceptance that beyond a certain
point, reason cannot go. Man can, by virtue of his reason, figure out that there
is a Creator, that He ought to be worshipped, etc. But anything more complex
requires direct illumination from God; indeed, without such illumination we can
be sure of nothing of importance. Aristotle and St. Thomas denied this, holding
that human reason unaided can go quite far, indeed.
d. Subtle Matter
This is the assertion that angels and spirits are made of a
matter like but unlike that of the physical world; unlike it that it can be
invisible, weighs little, moves quickly, etc; like in that beings composed of it
can affect physical objects, and can be, as it were, measured or perceived to
some degree. Holders of this belief would assert that only God can be
immaterial, for He alone is unchangeable. (Angels, while of immovable Will, did
change at least once, when they took up sides at Satanės revolt). Moreover, the
Second Council of Nicaea ruled in favour of this belief, when it approved the
following passage from a book by John of Thessalonica:
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Respecting Angels, Archangels, and their powers, to which I
also adjoin our own Souls, the Catholic Church is indeed of the opinion that
they are intelligences, but not entirely bodiless and senseless, as you
Gentiles aver; she on the contrary ascribes to them a subtile body, aerial or
igneous, according to what is written: "He makes His angels spirits, and His
ministers a burning fire." |
Although not corporeal in the same way as ourselves, made of
the four elements, yet it is impossible to say that Angels, Demons, and Souls
are incorporeal; for they have been seen many a time, wearing their own body, by
those whose eyes the Lord has opened.
In any case, this was also the teaching of Plato; following
Aristotle, St. Thomas denied this. There were other issues involved, but these
are the best known.
11. On what issues did St. Thomas Aquinas clash with St.
Bonaventure? (Back to Top)
All of the above, to be sure. Also, St. Thomas held that the
Will precedes the Intellect; St. Bonaventure believed it was the other way
around. But there was more that that at issue; it was a question of the whole
tone of philosophy. How rigid is the proper boundary between theology and
philosophy? For St. Thomas, the twain could never meet, although theology was
superior; for St. Bonaventure, any philosophy which ignored theology simply
could not be true. How could there be any real wisdom if one ignores the major
facts of existence? And, of course, there was one other little problem.
Neo-Platonism does indeed appeal to the poet in us, to the adventurer. It can be
little surprise that both Dom Gueranger and Fray Junipero Serra were both
Platonists. But Aristotle and his teachings were and are coldly intellectual.
Thus we see that part of the problem is a matter of disposition. If one wishes
to go out and do great deeds for Christ, St. Bonavenutre and his ilk will
inspire him. If he wishes simply to stay in the lecture hall and calmly
contemplate reality, he will find the Summa Theologica more to his taste. But as
I have said, St. Thomas was not really a Thomist, and refused to finish the
Summa. If you really want to understand St. Thomas, read his Office for the
Feast of Corpus Christi, and his Catena Aurea. Then (if you can find one) attend
Mass in the old Dominican Rite --- the same Rite he offered.
St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas were the dearest of
friends at the University of Paris; as they were united in life, as they are in
heaven, so ought they to be in our esteem.
12. Which were you first, an ultra-realist or a
monarchist? (Back to Top)
A Monarchist, to be sure. For a start, it was sentimental;
being French-Canadian on my fatherės side, I knew that Louis XIV had sent my
ancestors to Canada, and that Louis XVI was unjustly murdered. My mother was a
fierce Habsburg proponent, and my father had as well an attachment to the
Jacobites. What was true of Louis XVI was also true of Charles I and Nicholas
II. I felt a great deal of sympathy for the Loyalists, giving up everything for
their Monarch and going off in exile to Canada and the Bahamas. And of course, I
knew that Christ was King, not President. Certainly the rich symbolism of Royal
ceremony had it effect as well.
When I got older I began to study these things in and out of
school. It seemed to me that the Reformation and the American, French, and
Russian Revolutions were all symptoms of the same basic phenomenon. Moreover, I
read various theorists of Monarchy, not least of all Belloc and Chesterton. By
the time I left College, I was a confirmed Monarchist.
I then learned of the question of "No Salvation Outside the
Church." It was apprent to me from my historical research that certainly the
Church HAD taught this dogma, and just as certainly that her spokesmen now
denied it. How was this possible for an infallible Church? And if it were
possible with this dogma, why not all the others. Surely, if the Church is not
necessary for the Salvation of every one, it is necessary for no one. Moreover,
the Crusades and the Inquisition would have been the worst injustices, and
missionary work of kind useless folly. My discovery of the work of Fr. Feeney
supplied the answer: the dogma of Salvation was simply true, despite all the
non-infallible claptrap to the contrary.
But this left another question. How did we get into the
strange position of a majority of the clergy calling heresy the very dogma which
alone justifies their existence (as an income-absorbing class, that is)? In
other words, how did we get into this mess.
Again, history provided an answer. In great (though not sole)
part, our troubles stem from the attempt to express the Faith through basically
materialistic terms. Judged from the perspective of Aristotle, the Catholic
Faith is folly. If one attempts to combine the two, he may succeed for his own
time; but in the end the inborn tendencies of the philosophy must (and have work
themselves out. Rather than seeing the Faith as an organic whole, which has
repercussions in every corner of life, from government to art, it becomes a mere
set of propositions to be memorised --- or altered, if they do not accord with
what appears to be reason.
And so, I became an Ultra-Realist, convinced that the great
ruin can only be reversed if the ideas which created the Catholic synthesis in
the first place are allowed to act. To do that they must once again be promoted.
Thus I stand.
13. Did you become one as the result of the other?
(Back to Top)
Certainly. As just intimated, my researches into the decline
of Monarchy reinforced those into the decline of the Church. The republican
Charles Fenyvesi writes:
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An age of fable has ended. The world has gotten old;
skepticism is our wisdom. We do not believe in the magic of pedigree, and we
expect the son not to take up his fatherės role. There are no more
once-and-future Kings foretold and prayed for; no secret sons and false
pretenders; no Royal pathos of trust and betrayal. We have cancelled faith,
the gold standard of monarchy, as well as "the Pleasure of His Majesty," once
the common currency.
Republican accountability requires a pursuit of the
rational. Citizens bow to the technician whose presumption is efficiency and
whose excuse is science. He knows all about systems, and "functional" is his
highest praise.
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With very little alteration, much can be said of the changes
in the Church. So you might say that the analogy of the decline of Monarchy
prepared me to accept Ultra-Realism, when, like almost all who consider
themselves Traditional Catholics, I had always thought that Thomism was simply
THE Catholic philosophy.
14. How is the Platonic world-view demonstrated from
Scripture? (Back to Top)
Constantly, particularly in the New Testament, although the
Wisdom books, with their personification of Wisdom as a Holy Woman (and
prefiguring of the Virgin) are certainly very much in that style. Throughout the
New Testament we are told of the importance of "Good Will." St. John tells us
that God "enlightens every man who comes into the world." There is peace "for
men of Good Will." The Church is certainly treated like a Platonic Universal in
the Epistles, rather than a mere sum of its members. All this stuff about
becoming a new creature at baptism and so on. It is for this reason that
Moderate Realists rarely look to the Bible as a source of philosophical
knowledge, simply dismissing it as religious.
15. Specifically, why did the medieval
theologians/philosophers reject the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception? It
can't be because of Aristotle because the Ultra realists, such as Bonaventure,
denied the doctrine as well. (Back to Top)
Yes and no. Our belief in the Immaculate Conception goes back to the Bible, when
The Archangel Gabriel addressed Mary as "full of Grace," something manifestly
impossible if the person so addressed was in Original Sin. The early fathers all
believed the Mary was Immaculate from her conception; the Eastern Fathers being
more explicit on this point, however, than the Western. The liturgical
observance of the Feast started in the East, from whence it spread to England
and then to the rest of Europe (ironic in the light of this doctrineės later
denial by the Anglicans and Orthodox. The first serious opposition came from St.
Bernard of Clairvaux (an Ultra-Realist) who simply could not believe that the
Holy Ghost could be involved in something so unclean (to his mind) as
Conception). From his time on, two new issues arose: first, the Aristotelian
notion that the soul does not enter the body until the "quickening" became
almost universal long before Aristotleės philosophy was re-discovered; second,
it was feared that declaring Our Lady to be free from original sin would somehow
diminish Our Lordės uniqueness. These latter two views were summed up by St.
Thomas Aquinas in his Summa; after the Summa became the official teaching manual
of the Dominicans, that order made denial of the dogma part of its official
stance. Even the feast of the Immaculate Conception would only be celebrated by
them as the "Sanctification" for a long time.
However, among those untouched at all by Aristotle, the beief continued to
spread. Bl. Raymund
Lully was the first post-St. Bernard theologian to preach
it openly. Then Bl. Duns Scotus described it in the
terms we know to-day. But so late as the 17th century,
Pope Gregory XV (1621-1623) forbade either proponents
or opponents of the doctrine to label each other as
heretics --- so there was quite a good deal of confusion
until relatively recently."
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